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As more and more enterprises shift to the cloud, the pressure on SOC teams to protect them against threats rises exponentially. They are the very first line of defense against data breaches and cyber threats that become more frequent and more sophisticated. Increased investment of security tools results in unprecedented volumes of security data and alerts, and while SOCs do what they can to decipher the meaningful from the meaningless, they often become the bottlenecks of the enterprise’s security architecture.

It has never been a more challenging (or better) time to be a service provider for managed security services. With an estimated 1,200+ vendors selling a variety of security solutions today, businesses are looking for help to manage the complexities of supporting these technologies while protecting critical data. According to Gartner, the managed security service (MSS) market is expected to grow to nearly $50 billion by 2023, and last year 32% of organizations increased their use of outside services due to shortages in available resources.

Monitoring requires a multi-faceted approach if DevOps teams want end-to-end visibility and deep insight into issues. This is especially true in the case of modern microservices applications, which are essentially collections of distributed services that talk to each other over a service mesh.

Unless you’ve been living under a rock you are probably familiar with the recent Shadow Brokers data dump of the Equation Group tools. In that release a precision SMB backdoor was included called Double Pulsar. This backdoor is implemented by exploiting the recently patched Windows vulnerability: CVE-2017-0143.

Throughout the history of software development, one statement has remained true: no application is perfect. Due to that fact, development organizations must work with all resources at their disposal to limit the impact that application problems have on the end-user.

A number of domain “forgeries” or tricky, translated look-alikes have been observed recently. These attack campaigns cleverly abuse International Domain Names (IDN) which, once translated into ASCII in a standard browser, result in the appearance of a corporate or organization name that allows the targeting of such organization’s domains for impersonation or hijacking. This attack has been researched and defined in past campaigns as an IDN homograph attack.

Today’s modern deployment pipeline is arguably one of the most important aspects of an organization’s infrastructure. The ability to take source code and turn it into a production application that’s scalable, reliable and highly available has become an enormous undertaking due to the pervasiveness of modern application architectures, multi- or hybrid-cloud deployment strategies, container orchestration and the leftward movement of security into the pipeline.

The ability of an actor to remain undiscovered or obfuscating its doings when driving a malicious campaign usually affects the gains of such campaigns. These gains can be measured in different items such as time to allow completion of operations (exfiltration, movement of compromised data), ability to remain operative before take down notices are issued, or ability to obtain gains based on for-profit driven crimeware (DDoS for hire, Crypto mining).

Edge computing is likely the most interesting section of the broader world of IoT. If IoT is about connecting all the devices to the Internet, edge computing is about giving more processing power to devices at the edge. Edge computing views these edge devices as mini clouds or mini data centers. They each have their own mini servers, mini networking, mini storage, apps running on top of this infrastructure, and endpoint devices. Rather than sending data to the cloud for processing and receiving already-processed data from a central hub in the cloud, in edge computing all the processing happens on the edge device itself, or close to the edge device.

Our digital surface is expanding rapidly and threats are becoming more sophisticated day by day. This is putting enormous strain on security teams, which have already been stretched to the limits. Nonetheless, organizations are skeptical of relieving this cybersecurity strain with AI and automation. Why does this situation persist when it’s simply against the logic?

A type of credential reuse attack known as credential stuffing has been recently observed in higher numbers towards industry verticals. Credential stuffing is the process of automated probing of and access to online services using credentials usually coming from data breaches, or bought in the criminal underground.